

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02

INR-09 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14

USIA-12 ACDA-19 IO-13 OMB-01 T-03 AID-20 RSR-01 /159 W
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R 081321 Z MAR 73

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1409

INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T TEHRAN 1522

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IR, PK, IN, IZ, UR

SUBJ: IRANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS SUBCONTINENT

SUMMARY: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MIRFENDERESKI CONTINUES TO SEE IRAQI ARMS CAPER AS DIRECTED AGAINST IRAN AND FURTHERING HISTORICAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES TO ACQUIRE WARM WATER PORT. HE IS ALSO CRITICAL OF INDIA'S NEGATIVE POLICIES TOWARD PAKISTAN AND ITS AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDES IN AREA. WE CONSIDER MIRFENDERESKI A HAWK. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING MARCH 7 CALL ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MIRFENDERESKI ON OTHER MATTERS, DCM ASKED ABOUT LATEST GOI ASSESSMENT OF IRAQI ARMS CAPER. THIS RESULTED IN GENERAL DISSERTATION BY MIRFENDERESKI ON THREAT TO PEACE IN AREA, ON FUTURE OF PAKISTAN AND ON ROLE OF IRAQ, USSR AND INDIA IN THESE MATTERS WHICH WE ARE RECORDING AS REFLECTION OF GENERALLY EBULLIENT MOOD AMONG MORE SENIOR IRANIAN OFFICIALS THESE DAYS. IN EVALUATING MIRFENDERESKI'S VIEWS, ADDRESSEES SHOULD REALIZE THAT HE HAS A HAWKISH ATTITUDE ON IRAN'S ROLE IN THIS PART OF WORLD AND ESPECIALLY TOWARDS SUBCONTINENT. (SEE ALSO TEHRAN 0576.)

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2. ON MATTER OF IRAQI ARMS CAPER, MIRFENDERESKI SAID MFA HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SHED LIGHT ON MYSTERY OF EXACTLY WHAT IRAQ HAD IN MIND AND TO WHOM ARMS WERE DESTINED. HOWEVER, TWO CONCLUSIONS COULD READILY BE DRAWN FROM THIS OPERATION. FIRST, THIS WAS ANOTHER GOOD EXAMPLE OF WHAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM THAT " COLD- BLOODED MURDERER" SADAN HUSSEIN AND HIS IRAQI ASSOCIATES. THEY WERE AS IRRESPONSIBLE AS BLACK SEPTEMBER GANG AND IRAN HAD TO OPERATE ON ASSUMPTION THAT IRAQ WAS UP TO SAME KIND OF TRICKS IN GULF AND ELSEWHERE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GOP HAD SWITCHED SIGNALS PUBLICLY FROM ORIGINAL ALLEGATIONS THAT ARMS CAPER WAS ANTI- IRANIAN EXERCISE IN BALUCHISTAN AND BHUTTO WAS NOW EXPLOITING INCIDENT FOR HIS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR TO GOI THAT IRAQI ARMS CAPER WAS FUNCTION OF IRAQ' S GENERAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST IRAN AND THAT AT LEAST SOME OF ARMS WERE DESTINED FOR GROUPS IN BALUCHISTAN SEEKING TO CREATE TROUBLE THERE.

3. GOI' S SECOND GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT SOVIET HAND WAS BEHIND EXERCISE. MIRFENDERESKI SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH VIEWS OF VARIOUS FOREIGN MISSIONS IN TEHRAN AND ISLAMABAD WHICH ADVANCED THESIS THAT SOVIETS FAVOR STABILITY IN SUBCONTINENT AND DO NOT WANT DISMEMBERMENT OF PAKISTAN. THERE WERE ALSO THOSE WHO ARGUED THAT INDIA DID NOT BELIEVE THAT DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN IN ITS INTERESTS. HE DID NOT AGREE. CASE COULD BE MADE THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN IRAQI ARMS CAPER AND EXTENT OF DIRECT SOVIET PARTICIPATION WAS OPEN TO QUESTION. HOWEVER, OPERATIONS OF THIS TYPE SERVED SOVIET LONG- RANGE AMBITIONS TO ACHIEVE THEIR HISTORICAL OBJECTIVE OF WARM WATER PORT. FURTHER, WHILE INDIAN LEADERS MIGHT INTELLECTUALLY FAVOR A UNITED PAKISTAN, EMOTIONALLY THEY FELT OTHERWISE AND CHANCES WERE THAT EMOTION WOULD RULE IN ANY INDIAN DECISIONS ABOUT PAKISTAN. EMPHASIZING THAT ANY FURTHER DISINTEGRATION OF PAKISTAN COULD DEVELOP INTO CRISIS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE AND POSSIBLE WORLD CONFLICT, MIRFENDERESKI SAID IRAN, THE US AND OUR ALLIES HAD A VITAL STAKE IN UNITY OF PAKISTAN AND IN SUCCESS OF BHUTTO' S EFFORTS TO MOVE PAKISTAN FORWARD ECONOMICALLY AND DEVELOP A VIABLE POLITICAL SYSTEM. THIS WAS WHY SHAH HAD MADE A POINT OF WORKING CLOSELY WITH BHUTTO AND OF SUPPORTING BHUTTO ON SUCH ISSUES
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AS RECOGNITION OF BANGLADESH. EVERYONE SHOULD HELP, BUT

INDIA, WHICH COULD DO THE MOST, WAS NOT COOPERATING. IF INDIA WAS INTELLECTUALLY COMMITTED TO PAKISTAN'S UNITY AND BHUTTO'S SUCCESS, WHY THEN DID IT PUT OBSTACLES IN THE WAY? REASON WAS BECAUSE INDIANS COULD NOT THINK RATIONALLY ON SUBJECT OF PAKISTAN.

4. MIRFENDERESKI THEN WENT ON WITH CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RECENT INDIAN ACTIVITY IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND INDIAN OCEAN. HE SAID INDIANS HAVE INHERITED SOME OF IMPERIOUS WAYS OF THEIR FORMER BRITISH MASTERS AND HAD DEVELOPED A BIG POWER COMPLEX. THEY SEEMED TO CONSIDER INDIAN OCEAN AS THEIRS AND TO RESENT NORMAL EXPRESSION OF IRANIAN INTEREST IN AREA. THIS WAS WRONG AND IF INDIA HAS ANY FURTHER TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN INDIANS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE "CAUSUS BELLUM" FOR IRAN BUT "BELLUM."

5. DURING THIS COMMENTARY BY MIRFENDERESKI DCM NOTED AT ONE POINT THAT IN CONTRAST TO EMOTION WHICH CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN, IRAN SEEMED TO TREAT FREQUENT IRAQI PROVOCATIONS WITH GREAT RESTRAINT. MIRFENDERESKI'S ANSWER WAS "NOBLESSE OBLIGE."

6. COMMENT: INDIA BY NO MEANS HAS A MONOPOLY ON ARROGANCE. FARLAND

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*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a

*** Current Classification *** SECRET

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts:
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 MAR 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: sulserja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973TEHRAN01522
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: TEHRAN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730323/aaaahiba.tel
Line Count: 143
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: sulserja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 20 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <20-Jul-2001 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <31-Jul-2001 by sulserja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> jms 971113
Subject: IRANIAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS SUBCONTINENT
TAGS: PFOR, IN, IR, IZ, PK, UR
To: ISLAMABAD
JIDDA
KUWAIT
LONDON
NEA
NEW DELHI
SECSTATE WASHDC

Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005